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COMMENTS
RESTORATION OF COMPETENCY FOR
EXECUTION: FURIOSUS SOLO
FURORE PUNITUR
by Nancy S. Horton
For today, no less than before, we may seriously question the
retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehen-
sion of why he has been singled out and stripped of his funda-
mental right to life. Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized
societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips
with his own conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the
intuition that such an execution simply offends humanity is evi-
dently shared across this Nation. Faced with such widespread
evidence of a restriction upon sovereign power, this Court is
compelled to conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner
who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the condemned
from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to
protect the dignity of society itselffrom the barbarity of exact-
ing mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the
Eighth Amendment.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (citations omitted).
I. INTRODUCTION
N Ford v. Wainwright2 the United States Supreme Court held that the
eighth amendment prohibits the execution of a convicted capital defend-
ant who becomes insane while on death row. 3 Common law philosophy4
supports and state statutes5 codify the rationale for not executing the insane:
1. "Madness is its own punishment." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *395 (1769),
cited in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1986).
2. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
3. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that application of the death penalty
did not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amend-
meat. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion). Gregg emerged after a
four-year ban on the death penalty pursuant to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per
curiam) which abolished all existing state death penalty statutes.
4. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1.
5. See state statutes, supra notes 226-53 and accompanying text. Additionally, nations
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insanity is its own punishment. 6
The Ford holding left many questions unanswered regarding determina-
tion and restoration of competency for execution.7 Consider the cases of
Gary Eldon Alvord and Michael Owen Perry: In 1975, the state of Florida
tried, convicted, and sentenced Gary Alvord to death for three capital
murders.8 On November 24, 1984, five days before his execution, Alvord's
counsel submitted evidence that Alvord's mental condition had significantly
deteriorated in the ten years since trial, possibly resulting in his incompe-
tency for execution.9 Pursuant to Ford's substantive procedures regarding
determination of insane death row inmates, the Florida Governor immedi-
ately ordered a panel of three state psychiatrists to evaluate the prisoner's
mental condition.' 0 A psychiatric recommendation of Alvord's incompe-
tency for execution prompted the governor to stay the death penalty and
place Gary Alvord in a state mental facility for medical treatment."I Typi-
cal of most states, Florida requires a condemned prisoner found mentally
unfit for execution to be transferred and committed to a mental institution
until a hospital official determines that he has been "restored to sanity.' 12
During Alvord's respite at the mental institution, the state administered ex-
tremely powerful medication to him.' 3 Although the tranquilizing drugs ap-
peared to improve Alvord's mental capacity by subduing the major
symptoms of his mental illness, l"4 Alvord remained under the influence of
antipsychotic drugs when the state transferred him back to death row.15
Louisiana death row inmate Michael Owen Perry exhibits behavioral
characteristics similar to Alvord, and suffers from an extensive and docu-
generally prohibit execution of an insane prisoner. See United Nations Secretary General
statement: "With regard to mental illness, the majority of countries reported that this pre-
cludes the possible sentencing or execution of capital offenders." Capital Punishment Report of
Secretary General, E/1985/43, 26 April 1985, quoted in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY 76 (1987) [hereinafter AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL].
6. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406. The rationale is based on the English common law principle
that executing a prisoner who is unable to understand the nature of the punishment and why it
is to be imposed serves no retributive or deterrent value. See, e.g., Magwood v. Smith, 791
F.2d 1438 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (Alabama common law provides guidance determining sanity death
row procedures).
7. In addition to the restoration issue, Ford posed threshold questions regarding what
degree of evidence is required to create a right to a competency hearing, who should determine
the issue, and what methods should be used in that determination.
8. Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976), reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 874, petition for writ of mandamus denied, 396 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1981).
9. Radelet & Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent For Execution: Ethical Chaos
With Only One Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 300 (1988).
10. Florida's competency standard required Alvord to possess "the mental capacity to
understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(2) (West 1985).
11. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 9, at 301.
12. FLA. STAT. ANN § 922.07(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
13. Adler, The Cure That Kills, AM. LAW. at 29, 29-30 (Sept. 1, 1986).
14. Letter from Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections to
Wm. J. Sheppard, Attorney to Alvord (Aug. 17, 1987) [hereinafter VARGAS LETTER].
15. Id. As of November 1990, Alvord still waits on death row.
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mented history of a schizoaffective mental illness. 16 In 1983, during a re-
lease from a Louisiana state mental institution, Perry was arrested for
murdering five family members, including his mother and father. Based
upon the recommendations of several psychiatrists, the trial court initially
found Perry incompetent to stand trial and transferred him to a Louisiana
mental forensic facility where he received medical treatment.1 7 Eighteen
months later, the trial court determined him competent to stand trial.18
In 1985 the state of Louisiana tried, convicted, and sentenced Perry to
death.19 Although the Supreme Court of Louisiana confirmed the convic-
tion and sentence, the court suggested that a review of Perry's competency
for execution "might be in order." 20 Pursuant to Ford, the trial court ap-
pointed three psychiatrists and a psychologist to evaluate Perry's compe-
tency for execution. Each expert agreed that Perry was suffering from a
schizophrenic mental disorder which prevented Perry from remaining in
touch with reality and that the administration of a mind-altering drug,
Haldol, made Perry's thinking more coherent, rational, and less paranoid. 21
Even assisted with the powerful drugs, however, the experts concluded that
Perry is only sporadically competent to be executed and that his competency
cannot be predicted with reasonable certainty.22
In 1988 the trial court ruled that under the Ford standard of competence,
Perry was competent to be executed only when maintained on Haldol. 23
16. Perry's symptoms include auditory hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, and extremely
incoherent, delusional, and disordered thinking. See Amici Curiae Brief for Michael Owen
Perry at 2-3, Perry v. Louisiana, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989), reh'g denied, 545 So. 2d 1049,
vacated, 1990 WL 174052 (U.S.) (Nov. 13, 1990) (per curiam) [hereinafter Amici Curiae
Brief]; Hudsmith & Giarruso, "Grooming For The Kill:" Forced Medication Of The Insane
Death Row Inmate To Render Him Competent To Be Executed, THE CHAMPION 36-37 (Au-
gust 1990) (monthly publication by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
17. Hudsmith & Giarruso, supra, at 36; Amici Curiae Brief, supra, at 3.
18. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 16, at 3.
19. State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987), reh'g
denied, 484 U.S. 992 (1987).
20. Perry, 502 So. 2d at 564. Pursuant to a Louisiana statute, the court noted that Perry's
counsel, the court, or even the state prosecutor could raise the issue of competency for execu-
tion. Perry, however, has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he
lacks the capacity for execution. The court further stressed that "the determination of defend-
ant's sanity is for the trial judge, not a sanity commission." Id.
21. The medical professionals evaluating Perry included the following: Dr. Curtis Vin-
cent, Ph.D, Clinical Psychologist (March 5 evaluation concluding Perry incompetent to be
executed); Dr. Glen Estes, M.D. (March 9, 1988 evaluation concluding Perry has schizoaffec-
tive disorder and is completely unaware of the nature of proceedings against him); Dr. Ther-
esita G. Jimenez, M.D., Psychiatrist (February 4, 1988 evaluation concluding Perry
incompetent to be executed); Dr. Aris W. Cox, M.D., Forensic Psychiatry Consultant (Sep-
tember 7, 1988 evaluation concluding Perry incompetent to be executed).
For a complete transcript of each doctor's medical diagnosis, see Joint Appendix, Michael
Owen Perry v. Louisiana, at 52-67, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989), reh'g denied, 545 So. 2d 1049,
vacated, 1990 WL 174052 (U.S.) (Nov. 13, 1990) (per curiam) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
22. Doctor Jimenez concluded that Perry could probably regain competency for execu-
tion if the doctors properly adjusted the medication. See Joint Appendix, supra, at 64-65. Dr.
Cox, on the other hand, observed that Perry appeared to be "deteriorating and relapsing even
though he was receiving medication." Id. at 66-67.




Although the court recognized that Perry possessed a right in avoiding un-
wanted medication, the court determined that Louisiana's recognized inter-
est in carrying out the jury verdict outweighed Perry's interest.24 Therefore,
the trial court ordered the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Cor-
rections to forcibly medicate Perry in order to achieve his competency for
execution.25
Are Gary Alvord and Michael Perry legally competent to be executed?
What are the limits of determining "restoration of competency" for execu-
tion? The United States Supreme Court recently considered in Perry v. Loui-
siana whether the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit a state from
forcibly medicating a death row inmate with mind altering drugs in order to
make the inmate competent to be executed. The Court, however vacated
and remanded the Louisiana trial court decision without addressing the mer-
its of the issue. 26 This Comment analyzes the restoration issue and specifi-
cally probes whether a state may legally administer antipsychotic drugs to
an insane convicted capital offender for the express purpose of achieving
competency for execution. Part II examines the current status of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments in an execution context; Part III explores the
historical background of restoration of competency; and Part IV analyzes
the attempts by states, courts, and physicians to address and resolve the ethi-
cal and constitutional problems associated with restoration of competency
for execution. This Comment concludes that restoration of competency vio-
lates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Finally, this Comment
proposes an alternative to restoration of competency for execution and rec-
ommends that a state commute the death sentence to life imprisonment
upon a Ford determination that the death row inmate is incompetent to be
executed.
It is ordered that the defendant, Michael Owen Perry, is mentally competent
for purposes of execution in that he is aware of the punishment he is about to
suffer and he is aware of the reason that he is to suffer said punishment.
It is further ordered that defendant's competence is achieved through the use
of antitropic or antipsychotic drugs including Haldol and the Louisiana Depart-
ment of Public Safety and Corrections is further ordered to maintain the defend-
ant on the above medication as to be prescribed by the medical staff of said
Department and if necessary to administer said medication forcibly to defendant
and over his objection.
Joint Appendix, supra note 21, at 50-51. See also Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 16, at 4-5;
Hudsmith & Giarusso, supra note 16, at 36.
24. Joint Appendix, supra note 21, at 50-51.
25. Id.
26. State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989), reh'g denied, 545 So. 2d 1049, vacated, 1990
WL 174052 (U.S.) (Nov. 13, 1990) (per curiam). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on
October 2, 1990 and issued its per curiam opinion only one month later. The Court merely
concluded that "[t]he judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the 19th Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Louisiana for further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
- (1990). It is so ordered." Id.
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS IN
AN EXECUTION CONTEXT
A. The Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment upon persons convicted of criminal wrongdoing.27 In Ingraham v.
Wright 28 the Supreme Court outlined three ways that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause constitutionally prohibits states from application of crim-
inal punishment. 29 First, the cruel and unusual punishment clause "imposes
substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such."
30
Second, the clause determines the types of punishments which states may
constitutionally impose, including imprisonment, fines, and forfeitures.31
Third, the cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibits application of ex-
cessive punishment or punishment which is too severe for the crime for
which it is imposed. 32 A punishment is excessive when it does not "comport
with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment.
33
Thus, the criminal punishment must not result in "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain."' 34 Although the Supreme Court concluded that the death
penalty is not per se unconstitutional criminal punishment, 35 a state's appli-
cation of the death penalty may, in certain instances, violate the eighth
amendment if the penalty completely lacks either of the peneological crimi-
nal punishment justifications of deterrence or retribution. 36
Relevant in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual are
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."' 37 In reaching this objective standard of community values to pro-
hibit degradation of an individual's honor and dignity, courts analyze vari-
27. The eighth amendment states "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
28. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
29. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
30. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667. For instance, the Court found unconstitutional the crimi-
nal punishment of a person for exercising or possessing personal traits in the absence of an
illegal act. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67 (cruel and unusual punishment to impose crimi-
nal sanctions based on defendant's addiction to narcotics).
31. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667.
32. Id.
33. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
34. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
35. See supra note 3.
36. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion) (death
penalty for juvenile offenders unconstitutional because does not encompass "measurable con-
tribution" to goals of retribution and deterrence); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(death penalty unconstitutionally purposeless and needless unless contributes to peneological
goals of retribution and deterrence); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 237-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (death
penalty furthers no legitimate retributive goals).
37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
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ous factors, including international custom, 38 legislative and congressional
statutes, 39 actual jury verdicts and sentencing, 40 historical evolution of com-
mon law,4 1 public sentiment and community morals. 42
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
The fifth and fourteenth amendments protect persons against governmen-
tal intrusions on life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 43
When faced with a due process issue, courts first determine whether the de-
fendant possesses a legitimate protected liberty or property interest.44 Lib-
erty interests may be created by the Constitution, 45 a statute,46 a state
regulation,47 a court order,4 s or a standard policy, method, or custom.49
Upon affirmative conclusion that a liberty or property interest exists, courts
then analyze the current practice to determine the procedural protections
required under due process in order to protect that interest.50
In an imprisonment context, the Supreme Court generally concludes that
the interest is not protected under constitutional safeguards if the prison offi-
cial possesses discretionary authority to limit such liberty interest.5 1 The
Court reaches this conclusion by balancing the prisoner's interest in remain-
38. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 & nn.31 & 34 (plurality opinion) (recognizing inter-
national custom of Western European countries, countries with Anglo-American culture, the
Soviet Union, and three human rights treaties, all of which conclude that application of the
death penalty to juvenile criminals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
39. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987) (decisions of state legislatures most
important indication of evolving community standards).
40. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (plurality opinion) (jury is "significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved").
41. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-07 (1986) (relying on common law prohibition
against executing insane prisoner).
42. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298-99 n.34 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(addressing public opinion polls indicating lack of support for mandatory death sentence).
43. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part: "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth
amendment provides in relevant part: -[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976).
45. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (fourteenth amendment liberty inter-
est in not being transferred to mental hospital).
46. Id at 487-90 (statute outlining requirements for prison transfer to mental institution
created liberty interest in freedom from transfer).
47. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (state regulation explicitly promulgat-
ing required procedures created protected liberty interest in freedom from administrative
detention).
48. Kelsey v. Minnesota, 622 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (district court
decision establishing procedures for prison disciplinary hearing creates constitutional liberty
interest).
49. Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1985) (state policy requiring frequent
review of inmates placed in "close management" created liberty interest).
50. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (due process requires courts to
weigh nature of private interest affected, risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty, and govern-
ment interest).
51. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466-67 (1981) (since Board
given complete discretion, routine procedure practiced 75% of time does not create protected
liberty interest in parole date).
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ing free from an erroneous decision, the government interest in maintaining
prison security, and the court's ability to institute additional procedures to
avoid the risk of error.52
C. Ford v. Wainwright
In 1986 the Supreme Court held in Ford v. Wainwright 5 3 that executing a
prisoner who becomes insane on death row constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 54 Whether the Court will
interpret the Constitution as placing a substantive restriction on the state's
power to chemically restore the mental health of an insane prisoner for exe-
cution purposes, however, remains an open issue.
Ford involved a fact scenario similar to that of Gary Alvord and Michael
Perry; Alvin Ford, a convicted prisoner facing capital punishment, became
insane after a lengthy confinement on death row. Evidence proved Ford
competent at the commission of his crime, at trial, and at sentencing. Pursu-
ant to the Florida statute governing determination of a death row prisoner's
competency, 55 the governor ordered a mental evaluation of Ford. Three
psychiatrists conducted a thirty-minute group interview and diagnosed him
as incompetent, yet all three experts differed in their mental diagnosis. De-
spite their incompetency recommendation, the Florida Governor signed the
death warrant.
1. The Eighth Amendment
Writing the five to four majority decision for the Court, Justice Marshall
traced society's justification for not executing an insane prisoner and ex-
amined various common law rationales in support of the prohibition:56
madness is its own punishment, execution of the insane serves no retributive
value, execution of the insane fails to deter, execution deprives the insane
inmate of the opportunity to assist in his defense, execution prevents the
insane individual from making spiritual restitution before death, and execu-
tion of mentally incompetent individuals simply offends human dignity."7
Lack of retributive value, however, surfaced as the primary reason for not
executing an insane person; when the individual cannot comprehend the rea-
son for his punishment and, ultimately, the reason for his execution, society
does not benefit from the punishment.58
52. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (prisoner's interest in avoiding arbitrary
or erroneous determination as mentally ill outweighs state's interest in segregating and treating
mentally ill prisoners; Court instituted constitutional safeguards of notice and adversary
hearing).
53. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
54. Id at 409-10.
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
56. Traditionally, executing an insane prisoner offends humanity; the punishment is "sav-
age and inhuman." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25 (1769), quoted in Ford, 477
U.S. at 406.
57. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404-07.
58. Id. See generally Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, and the Death Penalty: A Note on Imple-
menting Supreme Court Decisions, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 233-37 (1988) (addressing
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In addition to common law, the Court analyzed "objective evidence of
contemporary values" in state statutes which indicate society will not toler-
ate executing "one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own con-
science or deity." 59 The Court thus concluded that execution of the insane
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.6° Justice Marshall cited previous
Supreme Court cases addressing capital punishment of insane prisoners and
noted the developing trend toward interpreting the eighth and fourteenth
amendments as guaranteeing greater protection of a prisoner's constitutional
rights.61 The majority concluded that under the "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society," 62 the eighth amend-
ment prohibits execution of the insane.63
Justice Powell concurred with the Court's eighth amendment prohibition
of capital punishment of the insane. 64 However, Justice Powell claimed the
majority failed to promulgate a legal test of competency for execution and,
in turn, proposed a two-pronged competency standard:65 first, the prisoner
must be aware of the punishment he or she is about to suffer, 66 and, second,
the prisoner must understand the reasons why death is to be inflicted. 67 In
short, the prisoner must comprehend the nature, pendency, and purpose of
the execution.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
Although seven Justices held that the Florida statutory procedures68 vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment, 69 the Court failed to issue a majority opin-
ion delineating the precise substantive due process procedures a state must
six common law reasons for not executing an insane person: 1) exculpation, 2) proportionality,
3) deterrence, 4) humaneness, 5) theological, and 6) retribution).
59. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406, 409. The Court noted that states currently prohibit execution
of the insane. Id at 408. See infra section on state statutes at notes 228-53 and accompanying
text.
60. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
61. Id. at 405.
62. Id. at 406 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
63. Id. at 409-10. For a discussion of the societal and human impact of capital punish-
ment, see Smykla, The Human Impact of Capital Punishment: Interviews with Families of
Persons on Death Row, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 331 (1987).
64. Ford, 477 U.S. at 418-27 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
65. Id. at 422. Although the majority has not expressly approved Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion standard, Powell's test has been enacted into state law, recognized by federal and
state courts, and referred to positively by numerous members of the Supreme Court. See
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2954, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 287-88 (1989) (a prisoner who
does not meet Powell's two-pronged test "cannot be executed"); Lowenfield v. Butler, 843
F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1988); State v. Rice,
757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988); Ex Parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en
banc). See also state statutes supra notes 228-53 and accompanying text; ABA Standards,
supra notes 254-69 and accompanying text.
66. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422.
67. Id.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
69. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410-18 (plurality) (Marshall, J., with Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens); id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., with White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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initiate to determine inmate insanity.70 The plurality opinion, authored by
Justice Marshall, requires an adversary fact-finding procedure without man-
dating a full evidentiary hearing before a judge.7 1 The plurality permits
states to develop their own death row insanity procedures as long as those
procedures cure the constitutional defects in Florida's statutory process. 72
Justice Powell argued against a complete sanity trial and, rather asserted
that a limited board hearing, which provides the inmate with an opportunity
to present evidence, would sufficiently protect the prisoner's constitutional
due process rights.73 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White,74 con-
cluded that the fourteenth amendment provides the death row inmate with
limited constitutionally protected liberty interests.75 Justice O'Connor
found that this minimal due process interest, however, created only a right
to be heard in an informal competency for execution hearing.76
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented and rejected
both the eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment theory and the
fourteenth amendment due process theory.77 Rehnquist advocated adminis-
tration of the death penalty for insane death row prisoners and found all of
Florida's insanity procedures constitutionally acceptable, including an exec-
utive branch determination of sanity.78 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist urged
the Court not to constitutionalize the ban on executing the insane because no
state currently permits such practice.79 Because a prisoner previously re-
ceived a full trial on the issue of guilt and sentencing, Justice Rehnquist
found it unnecessary to require another trial to expressly decide insanity.80
As a result of these split holdings, the Supreme Court opinion provides
limited guidance to states in determining what types of procedures or com-
70. The Court merely concluded that the district court must conduct a sanity hearing for
Ford because the state court had not provided one for him. Id. at 418.
71. The plurality provided three reasons why the Florida statute determining mental com-
petency of a death row prisoner was constitutionally inadequate. First, the statute lacked any
procedure for the prisoner to present evidence of his incompetency. Id. at 413. Second, the
statute prevented an opportunity for cross-examination or impeachment of the three state-
appointed psychiatrists. Id. at 415. Third, the statute placed the absolute decision within the
judgment of the executive branch which appoints the examining psychiatrists and which con-
trols the prosecuting attorneys; the governor lacked neutrality and objectivity because the ex-
ecutive branch initiated "every stage of the prosecution of the condemned from arrest through
sentencing." Id at 416.
The Court also held that even if a state court determines that a prisoner is competent, a
federal court must hold an evidentiary hearing on habeas corpus if the state court did not
adequately provide the defendant with a full and fair hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254(d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(6) (1982). Id. at 411.
72. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17.
73. Id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
74. Id at 427-31 (O'Connor, J., with White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id at 429.
76. Id
77. Id at 431-35 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 434.
79. Id. at 435.
80. Id Justice Rehnquist warned that allowing judges to determine insanity would be an
"invitation to those who have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely spurious
claims of insanity." Id.
1990] 1199
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
petency standard govern restoration of a condemned prisoner's sanity.8 '
Nonetheless, Ford explicitly provides relief when the process determining an
inmate's sanity lacks sufficient due process guarantees. 82
D. Penry v. Lynaugh
In 1989 the Supreme Court in Penry v. Lynaugh8 3 refused to extend the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to
prevent states from executing mentally retarded prisoners. The Supreme
Court did, however, reverse and remand a Texas state court decision sen-
tencing a mentally retarded man to death because the Texas jury instruc-
tions did not consider mental retardation as an individual mitigating
circumstance when capital punishment was at issue.84 Although psychiatric
experts concluded that Penry suffered from mild to moderate mental retar-
dation and possessed the mental age of a seven year-old child, 5 the jury
rejected Johnny Penry's insanity defense and convicted him of rape and capi-
tal murder.86
Despite its apparent conflict with Ford's application of the eighth amend-
ment to capital punishment of mentally incompetent inmates, the Penry
Court upheld the execution of a mentally retarded inmate regardless of the
mentally retarded person's intelligence level or inadequate mental capac-
ity.8 7 Before addressing the merits of the case, the Court considered the
implication of Teague v. Lane,88 which banned retroactive application of
new rules announced on collateral review.89 In particular, Teague deter-
mined whether the Court had authority, to grant Penry judicial relief.90 In
the only unanimous portion of the Court's opinion, Justice O'Connor con-
81. See Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp 1523, 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (The Ford opinion is a
"precedential quagmire").
82. 477 U.S. at 410-13 (Any deficiency in state procedure would affect "presumption of
correctness" accorded state court's findings) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion); id. at 423-24
(Powell, J., concurring).
83. 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989).
84. Id at 2942, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 272. The jury sentenced Penry to death based solely on
three questions in the sentencing phase:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1990).
85. 109 S. Ct. at 2941, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 271. The doctors also concluded that Penry had
the social maturity of a nine to ten year-old child.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2942, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 272.
88. 109 S. Ct. 1060, 108 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989).
89. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952-53, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 285-86. Teague prevents the Court
from applying new rules on collateral review unless they fall into one of two exceptions.
Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356.
90. Penry's relief included the requirement that juries consider mental retardation as a
mitigating factor in capital sentencing. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 284.
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cluded that Penry fell into an exception outlined by Teague.91 Teague's non-
retroactivity exception allows courts to constitutionally place certain
conduct completely beyond the state's power to punish92 because of a de-
fendant's status or offense. 93 In Penry the status at issue is the eighth
amendment's prohibition against executing mentally retarded persons.94
Like the Ford opinion, Penry is fraught with numerous concurring and
dissenting opinions. Although not expressly supporting universal prohibi-
tion of the death penalty,9 Justice O'Connor, who authored the majority
opinion, was the only Justice who viewed mitigation as a determinative fac-
tor.96 She persuasively argued that mentally retarded persons are unique
individuals with different capabilities, and thereby require individual consid-
eration of mitigating circumstances in a capital sentencing determination. 97
O'Connor focused the Court's attention on the individual's mental capacity
rather than mental age, which she characterized as imprecise because age
undervalues the human experiences of mentally retarded persons and overes-
timates their ability to address and solve problems. 98
1. Mental Retardation and Mitigation
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun joined O'Connor in
the part of her opinion that overruled the Texas statutory application of the
death penalty to mentally retarded persons.99 Because punishment should
directly relate to the criminal defendant's personal culpability, the plurality
requires Texas juries to mitigate any evidence of mental retardation when
determining whether to impose the death penalty.lco The plurality con-
cluded that the Texas law limiting the jury's sentencing decision to three
questions prevents the jury from expressing its "reasoned moral response"101
to relevant mental retardation evidence, and thus prohibits an individualized
capital sentencing determination.
91. Id. The Court relied primarily on two previous Supreme Court cases which required
courts to evaluate evidence relevant to character, background, and specific factual information
which would mitigate against imposing the death penalty. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
92. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 285.
93. Id. at 2953, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 285.
94. Id., 106 L. Ed. 2d at 286. Similarly, in a competency for capital punishment context,
the status could represent an express finding of sanity. Because Ford announced a new rule by
prohibiting execution of insane persons on eighth amendment terms, any further finding by the
court would simply be an extension of Ford's holding-and therefore not violative under
Teague.
95. Id. at 2958, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 292. No other Justice joined O'Connor in Part IV-C of
the Penry opinion.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2950-53, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 282-86.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2958, 2963, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 292, 298 (plurality).
100. Id.
101. IdM at 2947, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 279 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original)).
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2. Mental Retardation and the Eighth Amendment
In turn, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined O'Connor in the part of her opinion finding no eighth amendment
constitutional protection for mentally retarded persons.10 2 The Justices fur-
ther advocated full utilization of the Texas death penalty.10 3 By comparing
the definition of "mental retardation" proposed by the American Associa-
tion of Mental Retardation (AAMR)104 to the common law term of "id-
iot,'1O5 the Court attempted to distinguish the execution of a mentally
retarded person from that of an incompetent person. °6 Penry is mentally
retarded; although he possesses limited mental and behavioral capability,
Penry can distinguish between right and wrong.107 Ford, Alvord, or Perry
are legally incompetent; each is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct and, therefore, lacks the reasoning capacity to form criminal intent.
Finally, the Penry Court conducted an evaluation of current public senti-
ment and national consensus to conclude that execution of a mentally re-
tarded person does not offend the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." 108 Although the Court cited numerous
public opinion polls and medical organizations opposing execution of the
mentally retarded, lack of state legislation on the issue significantly influ-
enced the Court's conclusion that objective evidence failed to indicate an
emerging national consensus against executing mentally retarded persons. 109
Although the dissenting Justices concluded that the eighth amendment
prohibits execution of mentally retarded persons regardless of the degree or
severity of the mental handicap, 110 the four Justices submitted separate opin-
ions reaching that conclusion. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall pro-
vided reasons why the Court should extend O'Connor's mitigation holding
102. Id at 2964, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 299 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See also Note, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty and the Mentally Retarded: Fairness,
Culpability, and Death, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1211 (1990) (arguing death penalty
for mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment).
103. Id at 2966-68, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 302-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. The AAMR requires a mentally retarded person to possess an I.Q. below 70 as well as
adaptive behavioral problems. Id. at 2941 n. 1, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 271 n. 1.
105. Common law courts referred to "idiots" as those persons possessing no capacity to
reason, comprehend, or distinguish between right and wrong. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2954, 106 L.
Ed. 2d at 287.
106. Id. (quoting American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 4.01, at 61 (1985) ("A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law")).
107. Id. at 2942, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 272. Psychiatric experts concluded that Penry did not
suffer from mental illness because he possessed a limited mental capacity to understand crimi-
nal responsibility.
108. Id. at 2953, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 286 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion); Ford, 477 U.S. 399, 406.
109. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2955, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 289. Penry proposed only one federal law
and one state statute to support his argument that states opposed the execution of mentally
retarded persons.




to a constitutional cruel and unusual punishment standard."II Both Justices
believe that executing a mentally retarded person furthers neither of the pri-
mary capital punishment objectives of retribution or deterrence.11 2 The Jus-
tices thus concluded that nothing could be more "purposeless and
needless" 1 3 than the pain and suffering inflicted when executing mentally
retarded persons." 1 4 Justice Stevens and Blackmun' 15 argued that the amici
curiae briefs of the American Association of Mental Retardation and many
others "compels the conclusion that such executions [of mentally retarded
persons] are unconstitutional."' "16
Both the Ford and Penry holdings are ambiguous in terms of defining the
competency standard required for execution. Justice O'Connor repeatedly
referred to criminal responsibility at the time of the offense, yet failed to
differentiate between criminal responsibility and capacity for execution." 7
The Penry Court cited Justice Powell's two-pronged Ford standard" I8 in de-
termining that the eighth amendment does not categorically prohibit execu-
tion of mentally retarded persons, yet never addressed how mental
retardation, as opposed to mental illness, should be evaluated to determine
competency for execution." 9 Nevertheless, Penry suggests that severely
mentally retarded persons never will be executed.' 20 It remains unclear
whether the Penry Court was implying that these individuals never would
get past the trial stage or whether, if found guilty, the extremity of the
mental retardation would create an incapacity to appreciate fully the crime
or to understand the reason for the impending execution.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SYNTHETIC SANITY
A. Synthetic Sanity Defined
Psychotropic drugs refer to a general category of medication that affects a
person's thinking processes and ability to communicate.' 2' Often character-
ized as "synthetic sanity" or "chemical competence,"'' 22 this mental condi-
tion is created when psychotropic medication is administered to restore
111. Id. at 2960-61, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 294-96 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
112. Id. at 2962, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 297.
113. Id at 2963, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
114. Id
115. Id (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id at 2963, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 299.
117. Id. at 2952-58, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 285-92.
118. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
119. Cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality) (juvenile offender is less
culpable than an adult for the same crime).
120. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2953, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 286.
121. Psychotropic drugs are defined as any medication including sedatives, tranquilizers,
hypnotics and antipsychotic drugs. Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic San-
ity, " "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antip-
sychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 77, 79 (1983).
122. Id.
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competence for defendants facing trial and execution.123 Antipsychotic
drugs, also referred to as neuroplectics or major tranquilizers, constitute a
subset of psychotropic medications that retard and reduce the symptoms of
complex mental illness, like schizophrenia, psychosis, and manic depres-
sion. 124 Approximately 70% of all death row prisoners are diagnosed with
schizophrenia or psychosis.' 25
Since their initial release in the 1950's, psychiatrists have generally chosen
antipsychotic drugs as the preferred treatment over mechanical restraints
and seclusion.126 Some critics consider these drugs a more effective and hu-
mane type of treatment for mental disorders; 127 others, however, still con-
sider them a chemical straitjacket. 128 Despite their beneficial effects,
antipsychotic drugs merely mask the debilitating symptoms of major mental
disorders; the drugs do not cure the mental disorder. 29 The patient usually
lapses back into a delusional state when he or she ceases taking the antip-
sychotic medication.' 30 Moreover, continual treatment creates severe side
effects, including often irreversible movement disorders such as dystonia,
akathesia, and tardive dyskinesia.13' Although other medications regulate
123. Treatment used to restore competency for defendants facing trial and execution con-
sists primarily of psychotropic medication such as Thorazine, Haldol, or Mellaril. Winick,
Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 769 (1977).
124. Id.
125. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5, at 108-09 (citing R. JOHNSON, CON-
DEMNED TO DIE: LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981)).
126. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 121, at 100.
127. See Note, The Use of Mechanical Restraints in Psychiatric Hospitals, 95 YALE L.J.
1836 (1986) (mechanical restraints negatively impact patient).
128. See Jost, The Right to Say No: Can an Inmate Refuse Medication?, A.B.A.J. 72, 73
(Feb. 1990). This ability to control behavior disorders through antipsychotic drugs has re-
sulted in a decreased population at mental hospitals by approximately seventy-five percent-
from 600,000 patients in 1955 to 160,000 patients in 1979. Id.
129. See Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized Mental Health Patients' Right to Re-
fuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 110 (1985).
130. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 121, at 100. Dr. Aris Cox, a forensic psychiatry
consultant who repeatedly examined Michael Perry on death row in response to the Louisiana
trial court's order to determine whether Perry is competent to be executed, compared his ob-
servations of Perry both on and off the neuroplectic medication.
During the times I have seen him off neuroplectic medication, it has been my
opinion that he was so psychotic and so out of contact with reality that he could
not appreciate the reason for his execution, nor indeed could he appreciate the
execution process itself, nor the seriousness of this sentence. At these times Mr.
Perry told me that he was God, and he did not feel that the electrocution pro-
cess would result in his death.
On the other hand, I have seen Mr. Perry at times when, on neuroplectic
medication, he has been in fairly good contact with reality, and certainly did
appreciate the seriousness of his situation and the purpose of his death sen-
tence.... It is my opinion that if Mr. Perry is allowed to remain off neuroplectic
medication for any significant period of time (by this I mean three weeks or
longer), I believe he will become so psychotic that he will not be competent to be
executed.
Joint Appendix, supra note 21, at 68-89 (emphasis added).
131. Dystonia results in severe muscle spasms of the face, throat, lips and tongue. Akathe-
sia creates restlessness to such a degree that patients are unable to remain stationary and are
constantly in a period of agitated frustration. Tardive Dyskinesia, the most common and seri-
ous of psychotropic drug side effects, causes repetitive involuntary spasms of the arm, hands,
trunk, face and especially the mouth where common motions like licking, sucking, and chew-
some of these side effects, most of the disabling disorders permanently affect
the patient even after the medication is ceased.
1 32
Both Michael Perry and Gary Alvord's mental condition fluctuates be-
tween active and remissive states. Psychiatrists have described the shifting
nature of Michael Perry's mental condition as a "moving target."1 33 Simi-
larly, psychiatrists who have treated Alvord during the past thirty years doc-
ument periods in which his illness stabilized and he appeared quite
normal.134 Yet this stability temporarily results from medication. Alvord's
medical history indicates that his tranquility crumbles during periods of
stress or uncertainty,1 35 as it did on death row during the week of his sched-
uled execution.1 36
B. Washington v. Harper
The decision by a patient whether to undergo a treatment or take a drug
raises fundamental issues pitting individual liberty against governmental au-
thority. In both civil and criminal jurisdictions, 1 37 different federal and state
constitutional rights recognize the patient's right to refuse antipsychotic
treatment. 138 Originally, federal courts broadly interpreted the fourteenth
amendment due process clause to constitutionally guarantee an individual's
right to refuse treatment. 139 Many states utilize the administrative proce-
dure outlined in Rogers v. Commission,140 wherein the state holds a judicial
hearing to determine whether an individual refusing treatment is competent
to make that medical decision. 141 If the defendant is found incompetent, the
court provides the defendant with a substituted judgment decision regarding
ing are grossly exaggerated. See Note, Protecting the Inmate's Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drugs, 64 WASH. L. REV. 459, 462-63 (1989).
132. Id. at 463. The Supreme Court recently characterized these side effects as "serious,
even fatal." Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1041, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 203 (1990).
133. Dr. Aris Cox, a forensic psychiatrist, who examined Perry concluded:
He [Perry] deteriorates quickly when off medication. So his competency status
tends to change, it's very labile, it moves about. What I meant by this perhaps
offhand remark ["moving target"] was that his competency changes frequently
and he's not in the same place all the time. And sometimes he's competent and
sometimes he's not.
See Petitioner's Brief for Michael Owen Perry at 17, Perry v. Louisiana, 543 So. 2d 487 (La.
1989), reh'g denied, 545 So. 2d 1049, vacated, 1990 WL 174052 (U.S.) (Nov. 13, 1990) (per
curiam) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
134. Letter from Emanuel Tanay, M.D., Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Wayne State
University to Win. J. Sheppard, Attorney to Alvord, at 114-15 (November 14, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter TANAY LETrER].
135. Id.
136. Mossman, Assessing & Restoring Competency to be Executed: Should Psychiatrists
Participate?, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 383, 398 (1987) (death row confinement creates traumatic
mental disorders).
137. For an analysis of civil and criminal cases addressing the right to refuse medical treat-
ment, see Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 121, at 77.
138. Id. at 79.
139. Id.




the right to refuse treatment. 142 The state usually determines the substituted
judgment decision. Ford, however, prohibits the executive branch or state
from individually determining competency for execution. Thus, the substi-
tuted judgement decision would be difficult to apply in the capital punish-
ment competency context. 143 Alternatively, other states allow mental health
professionals to provide an adequate substituted judgment of the state judi-
cial decision to determine competency. I" Again, however, this rationale ul-
timately places the medical professional in the ethical dilemma of
determining whether to administer treatment if continued treatment will re-
sult in execution. 145
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether an insane
death row inmate can refuse treatment that would medically restore compe-
tency for execution. Currently, federal circuits disagree on whether a state
corrections department may forcibly medicate a defendant to stand trial or a
convicted prisoner to restore competency. 146 One state court described the
use of psychotropic drugs for purposes contrary to treatment as "Orwel-
lian."' 47 In 1990, however, the United States Supreme Court held in Wash-
ington v. Harper 148 that a prison inmate does not have the right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs when administered by the state for purposes of prison
safety and the inmate's personal well-being and health. "49 Harper will play a
significant role in analyzing the fourteenth amendment aspects of compe-
tency for execution. 50
In 1976 Walter Harper was convicted of robbery and incarcerated at the
Washington State penitentiary. Harper spent a considerable amount of time
in the prison's mental health unit, and voluntarily consented to the adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs to treat his schizophrenic behavior. In 1981
the state sent him to a special institution which diagnoses and treats con-
victed felons with serious mental illness. At first, Harper voluntarily con-
sented to treatment; in 1982, however, he refused to continue taking the
antipsychotic drugs. Pursuant to a Washington state corrections policy,
142. Id. at 491, 458 N.E.2d at 310. See also Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1055
n.31, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 221 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. See Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1055, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 221 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing sole discretion of state medical personnel to determine forcible administration of
antipsychotic medication).
144. See Rennie v. Kline, 653 F.2d 836, 848-49 (3rd Cir. 1981).
145. As discussed infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text, medical professionals are
unwilling to accept the legal consequences of their actions.
146. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990) provides interesting insight into the conflicts created by restoration of compe-
tency. At the trial court, the judge allowed the government to forcibly medicate a defendant
found incompetent to stand trial. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 829 F.2d 479
(4th Cir. 1987). On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit reversed again and held that forcible medi-
cation is allowed only if conducted under medical supervision. Cf Large v. Superior Court,
148 Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399 (1986) (mentally ill prisoner confined to a corrections department
could not be forcibly treated with antipsychotic medication in a nonemergency setting).
147. See Large, 148 Ariz. at 309, 714 P.2d at 409 (1986).
148. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1990).
149. Id. at 1033-34, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 194.
150. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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SOC Policy 600.30, the doctor attempted to medicate Harper involuntarily.
Policy 600.30 states that if a psychiatrist determines that an inmate should
be medicated with antipsychotic drugs despite the patient's refusal, then the
inmate must appear for a hearing before a committee composed of three
medical professionals not currently treating the patient.151 If a majority of
the committee determines that the prisoner suffers from a "mental disorder"
and is either "gravely disabled" or poses a "likelihood of serious harm" to
himself, others, or property,152 then Policy 600.30 permits involuntary treat-
ment of the inmate with antipsychotic drugs. The Committee periodically
reviews the treatment every fourteen days, however, to determine the neces-
sity of continued treatment.
Harper alleged that the state violated his due process rights because the
doctors involuntarily administered the antipsychotic drugs before con-
ducting a judicial hearing. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and con-
cluded that Policy 600.30, which requires no judicial hearing, fully comports
with all the requirements of the due process clause of the United States Con-
stitution.' 53 In reaching its conclusion, the Court attempted to balance the
inmate's liberty interest in refusing involuntary administration of antip-
sychotic drugs with the state's interest in maintaining prison security by pro-
viding appropriate treatment to the inmate to reduce danger to such inmate
or others.154 Justice Kennedy, writing the six-justice majority opinion, re-
versed the Washington Supreme Court's standard of review requiring the
state to demonstrate a "compelling need" before administering the medica-
151. Id. at 1033, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 194. The Committee is composed of a psychiatrist, a
psychologist, and the official in charge of the mental health unit. The psychiatrist must vote
affirmatively to administer the medication involuntarily to the inmate.
152. Policy 600.30 borrowed the definitions of "mental disorder," "gravely disabled," and
"likelihood of serious harm" from a Washington involuntary commitment statute. See
Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033 n.3, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 194 n.3.
"Mental disorder" means "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has sub-
stantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions." WASH. REV.
CODE at § 71.05.020(2) (1987).
"Gravely disabled" is defined as "a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental
disorder: (a) [i]s in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his
essential human needs of health or safety, or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine func-
tioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or
her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety." Id. at
§ 71.05.020(1).
"Likelihood of serious harm" is "either: (a) [a] substantial risk that physical harm will be
inflicted by an individual upon his or her own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to
commit suicide or inflict physical harm on one's self, (b) a substantial risk that physical harm
will be inflicted by an individual upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused
such harm or which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such
harm, or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon the
property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused substantial loss or damage to
the property of others." Id. at § 71.05.020(3).
153. The inmate is provided with many due process rights at the hearing, including the
right to attend, to present evidence and witnesses, to cross-examine staff witnesses, and to the
assistance of a neutral and objective adviser. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033-34, 108 L. Ed. 2d at
194. The Supreme Court held that these evidentiary privileges comport with due process. Id.




tion,155 and instead utilized the analysis in Turner v. Safley' 56 to justify the
state's overriding interest in prison safety and security. The Turner stan-
dard157 for determining the validity of a prison rule that allegedly violates an
inmate's constitutional rights is whether the rule is "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests." 158
The Court then analyzed three factors to determine whether Policy 600.30
was reasonable under due process standards. First, a court must determine
whether the prison regulation or policy represents a "valid, rational connec-
tion" to a legitimate governmental interest justifying a particular action.159
Second, the court must evaluate the burden that accommodation of the al-
leged constitutional right places on guards, other inmates, and on the gen-
eral allocation of prison resources. 160 Third, a court must find a lack of
other alternatives to the prison regulation. 161
The Court quickly dismissed the first and second factors, finding the
state's interest in prison safety and security sufficiently greater than the in-
mate's liberty interest. 62 Because prison officials have a duty to prevent a
prisoner with a serious mental disorder from harming himself or others, the
Court felt that involuntary medication represented a reasonable method of
achieving that goal. 163 As to the third factor regarding alternatives to forci-
ble administration of antipsychotic medication, Justice Kennedy found that
other methods such as physical restraints or seclusion are not as effective,
either medically or monetarily. 64
Although the Court noted that as a matter of state law, Policy 600.30
155. The Washington Supreme Court applied a balancing test, and cited four nonexclusive
state interests sufficiently compelling to justify administering antipsychotic medication to a
non-consenting prisoner: preserving life, protecting third parties' interests, preventing suicide,
and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. The state was required to
prove such a compelling need by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence." Harper v. State,
110 Wash. 2d 873, 882-84, 759 P.2d 358, 364-65 (1988).
156. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
157. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 199 (1990) (citing
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The Turner Court developed this standard to determine the validity
of a prison regulation that severely restricted an inmate's right to marry; the right to marry is
protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 95-96.
158. Id.
159. Harper, 110 S. Ct at 1038, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 200 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
160. Id. at 1038, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 200 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
161. The Court noted, "[T]he absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonable-
ness of a prison regulation, but this does not mean that prison officials have to set up and then
shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitu-
tional complaint." Id. at 1038, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 200 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1038-39, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 200. The Court stated:
There can be little doubt as to both the legitimacy and the importance of the
governmental interest presented here. There are few cases in which the State's
interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is
greater than in a prison environment, which, 'by definition,' is made up of per-
sons with 'a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent,
conduct.'
Id.
164. Id. at 1039, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 201 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
Other courts apply a therapeutic standard and allow continued drug treatment only if it proves
to be the least restrictive means in serving the prisoner's best interest. See Large v. Superior
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guarantees the prison inmate the constitutional right to be free from arbi-
trary administration of antipsychotic medication 165 and that the injection of
psychotropic medication represents a "substantial interference with that per-
son's liberty" under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 166
the Court nevertheless concluded that an informed medical decision to treat
the inmate with antipsychotic drugs overrides the prisoner's liberty interest
in avoiding the forcible administration of the drugs. 167 Despite the risks and
serious side effects associated with antipsychotic drugs, the Court concluded
that "an inmate's interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better
served," by forcibly medicating the inmate.' 68 Moreover, the Court specifi-
cally delegated the decision whether to forcibly medicate to medical profes-
sionals, rather than to judges. 169
Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority, but urged states formally
to commit the mentally ill prisoner before forcibly attempting to medicate
him.' 70 Such a process, argued Justice Blackmun, benefits the prison in-
mate, the hospital, the doctors, and even the state itself.' 7'
Justice Stevens, joined in a dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, crit-
icized the majority for minimizing the prisoner's constitutionally recognized
liberty interest in refusing forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs,
misinterpreting the state's policy and the Court's analysis in Turner, and
mistakenly holding that a "mock trial before an institutionally biased tribu-
nal" guarantees due process.' 72 The dissent instead advocated the stance
adopted by the Washington Supreme Court, which required an adversarial
judicial hearing complete with its constitutional due process rights. Finally,
the dissenting Justices severely criticized the majority's failure to acknowl-
edge that medical professionals making the treatment decision are not neu-
tral decisionmakers.'17
Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399, 406 (1986) (in absence of emergency, forcible administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs violates prisoner's due process rights).
165. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 197-98.
166. Id. at 1041, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 203. Cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (compelled
surgery substantially interferes with liberty interest and violates fourth amendment); but see
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (extraction of blood for DWI test is insub-
stantial liberty interest).
167. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1041, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 203.
168. Id. at 1042, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 204.
169. Id. The Court flatly stated that the due process clause "has never been thought to
require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative
officer." Id. at 1042, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 204 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979)).
170. Id at 1044-45, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 208 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 1045, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 208.
172. Id at 1045-56, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 208-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
173. Id at 1052 n.20, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 216 ("The choice is not between medical experts on
the one hand and judges on the other; the choice is between decisionmakers who are biased
and those who are not"). The Harper Court noted that the prisoner's best interests fade when
medical professionals are forced to review the treatment decisions of their colleagues. Id. at
1052-53, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 217.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL: COMMUTE THE DEATH PENALTY TO*
LIFE IMPRISONMENT UPON A DETERMINATION OF
INCOMPETENCY FOR EXECUTION
A. Continuing Controversy Over Standards of Competency
Although Ford provided insane death row inmates with a constitutional
right to not be executed, the standards and judicial procedures protecting
this right differ greatly from state to state. The ambiguity primarily stems
from the varying definitions of "competency," "sanity," and "restoration of
competency." Since the issue of an accused person's mental competency
may be addressed at any period during a criminal proceeding,1 74 other com-
petency tests utilized throughout the criminal process are useful in evaluat-
ing the restoration of competency for execution test.
1. Competency at the Time of the Offense
Traditionally, competency at the time the crime is committed represents
the most important measurement of sanity.' 75 If the accused is not sane at
the time of the offense, he may not possess the required mens rea for criminal
responsibility.1 76 Insanity at the commission of the crime excuses the ac-
cused from legal responsibility. 77
2. Competency at the Time of Trial
Courts implement a competency test at the time of trial to ensure that the
prisoner can participate in his or her own defense.178 In Dusky v. United
States 179 the Supreme Court described the common law test for competency
to stand trial: the two-part test first determines whether the defendant pos-
sesses sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and, second, whether the defendant has a
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings.180 The defendant's
ability to meaningfully participate in the proceedings constitutes the core
issue, not the defendant's criminal responsibility.' 8 ' Insanity at the time of
trial, therefore, temporarily delays the legal proceedings until the accused
regains mental competency.' 8 2
174. Heilbrun, The Assessment of Competency for Execution: An Overview, 5 BEHAV. ScI.
& L. 383, 384 (1987).
175. A finding of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) or Guilty But Mentally Ill
(GBMI) encompasses an entirely distinct issue and is beyond the scope of this Comment.
176. See Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: Statutory Changes and a New Test for Sanity:
You Can't Execute Me, I'm Crazy!, 35 CLEV. ST. L.R. 515, 532 (1987).
177. Various standards have been developed to determine competency at the time of the
offense including the M'Naughten Rule, Irresistable Impulse test, Product Rule, and Substan-
tial Capacity Test. See Entin, supra note 58, at 222-23.
178. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180-83 (1975) (due process requires trial court to
make further inquiry into defendant's competency to stand trial when evidence presented rea-
sonable doubt as to defendant's competence).
179. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
180. Id. at 402.
181. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (discussing Dusky standard).
182. A primary criticism of this temporary delay is "insanity by choice;" accused defend-
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Historically, courts have held that the trial of a defendant on medication
violates federal and state constitutional due process rights primarily for one
of two reasons: 18 3 either the administration of the drugs alters the defend-
ant's normal mental functioning and thus affects the defendant's participa-
tion at trial, 1 4 or the antipsychotic drugs suppress the defendant's
courtroom demeanor. 185 Courts advocating an unmedicated condition re-
garding competency generally hold that a defendant who becomes incompe-
tent to stand trial because he voluntarily and competently chooses to
withdraw from the medication may have waived his right to be tried while
competent.'8 6 Other courts hold that competency to stand trial for criminal
defendants on psychotropic medication does not violate due process
rights. 18 7 When trial competency is based on the defendant's ability to con-
sult with counsel and to understand the legal proceedings,' 88  then the
defendant is competent, despite the fact that the defendant receives
medication. 189
ants may reject the psychiatric treatment thereby remaining mentally ill and preventing the
state from prosecuting. See 60 MINUTES: INSANE BY CHOICE (CBS Television Broadcast,
September 10, 1989). But see United States v. Shawar, 865 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1989) (court
hospitalized for a reasonable period defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial to
determine whether a substantial probability existed whereby he would attain trial competency
in the foreseeable future).
If a federal court finds a defendant incompetent to stand trial, the defendant is committed to
the custody of the Attorney General for treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (1988). The defend-
ant may be hospitalized only "for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four
months," in order for the court to determine whether substantial probability exists that the
defendant will regain competency to stand trial in the "foreseeable future." 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(d)(1) (1988). Detainment over a period longer than four months to determine compe-
tency violates due process; after such time, the government must either free the defendant or
initiate civil commitment proceedings. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (due
process violated when defendant's commitment of three and one-half years exceeded reason-
able time necessary to determine whether defendant would regain competency).
183. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 121, at 89-99. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96,
492 P.2d 239 (1971) is the most widely cited case supporting the trial of a non-medicated
defendant. The Maryott appellate court held that state administered tranquilizer drugs vio-
lated defendant Maryott's due process rights because the drugs visibly affected and altered his
expressions, manner, and entire demeanor at trial.
184. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983) (constitutional
right guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendment ensures the accused murderer's right
to present himself in an unmedicated state when mental capacity is at issue).
185. See State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960) (en banc) (first degree
murder conviction reversed because right to appear in unmedicated state is a protected due
process right).
186. Cf Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant waived right to attend trial by
disruptive courtroom behavior).
187. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 555 A.2d 1264 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1989) (first-degree mur-
der conviction affirmed despite defendant's reliance on anti-depressant medication for
schizophrenia).
188. In State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978), the issue focused on a defend-
ant's competency to stand trial. The court held that due process rights are not violated be-
cause the medication, which was also taken at the time of the offense, "has a beneficial effect on
the defendant's ability to function and that without the medication he is incompetent to stand
trial." Id. at 1381.
189. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553
P.2d 1296 (1976) (defendant's due process rights not denied when opportunity existed to in-
form jury about a drug's effect and when defendant's demeanor is not at issue).
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B. Restoration of Competency for Execution Violates the
Eighth Amendment
The Supreme Court's modem capital punishment jurisprudence reflects a
concern for the accuracy and reliability of constitutional rights. 19° Due to
the unique nature of the death penalty, which makes it "profoundly different
from all other penalties,"' 191 the Supreme Court requires states to apply
more strict substantive and procedural safeguards in the capital punishment
context.' 92 The concern for accuracy, need for reliability, and seriousness of
the punishment is undermined, however, when states administer antip-
sychotic drugs to insane death row inmates solely to achieve competency for
execution.
The Supreme Court currently holds that execution of insane death row
inmates constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and offends the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 193
Likewise, a state's attempt to synthetically and temporarily restore the com-
petence of an insane death row inmate in order to execute that inmate cir-
cumvents and violates both the common law rationale and Ford's
prohibition against executing the insane.
1. Restoration of Competency for Execution Compromises Medical Ethics
The definition of "sanity" or "competency" theoretically encompasses a
legal, as opposed to medical, term. Judicial proceedings determine sanity or
competency even though the medical or psychiatric evaluation ultimately
becomes the determinative factor in the court's decision. 194 The legal deter-
mination of sanity requires the medical and psychiatric profession to assume
often conflicting dual roles of doctor and evaluator. 19 First, the psychiatrist
must evaluate the death row prisoner to determine competency for execu-
tion; second, if found incompetent, the psychiatrist must medically treat the
prisoner to restore competency for execution; third, the psychiatrist must
190. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Justices
White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia) ("we are naturally mindful in such cases that the
'qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability
when the death sentence is imposed' " (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604)). See also Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, &
Stevens, J.J.) (eighth amendment creates special need for reliability that death is appropriate
punishment in capital case).
191. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion). See also Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (death penalty clearly "unique in its severity and irrevocabil-
ity" (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion))); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stevens, J., concurring) (death penalty differs from all
other types of criminal punishment not in degree but in character).
192. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (greater need for safe-
guards in death penalty cases because death uniquely severe and irrevocable).
193. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S., 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
194. See Standard 7-5.7(d), ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS:
COMPETENCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987) (qualified mental health professionals
should conduct all competency evaluations; because death is irrevocable, the medical expert
must possess an impeccable level of expertise. The court, however, is the final decision maker).
195. See Entin, supra note 58, at 224-33; Adler, supra note 13, at 31.
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report to the judicial factfinder when the death row inmate has chemically
regained his or her sanity. In effect, the psychiatrist actively signs the de-
fendant's death warrant by initiating the execution procedure.' 96
Consistent with the public interest in preserving the medical profession's
integrity, the United States Supreme Court defers to the medical profession
in so-called "essentially medical" due process questions. 197 In the eighth
amendment setting, this judicial deference recognizes not only the profes-
sionalism of the medical community, but also the significance of the profes-
sion's ethical standards as "objective evidence of contemporary values"
bearing upon society's "evolving standards of decency."' 198 The legal deci-
sion-maker primarily relies on the expert psychiatric opinion and the medi-
cal evaluation to determine competency of the death row inmate.
Psychiatric evaluations, however, are subjective. 199 The controversial na-
ture of the death penalty exacerbates this inherent medical imprecision.2°°
Although most conflicting psychiatric evaluations legitimately result from
bona fide differences of medical opinion, the doctor's personal convictions
regarding the death penalty may influence his or her professional
diagnosis. 201
Since 1980 the medical profession has adamantly opposed direct physician
participation in state executions because the executions conflict with the
healing profession's ethical values. 202 When several states enacted statutes
authorizing capital punishment by lethal injection in the late 1970s,203 medi-
cal organizations openly criticized their forced participation to preparing,
administering, monitoring, and supervising the deadly drug.2°4
Like the use of lethal injections, medical treatment restoring competency
constitutes a form of execution that inherently conflicts with medical eth-
196. See Entin, supra note 58, at 224; Adler, supra note 13, at 31.
197. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (Supreme Court defers to "subtleties
and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis" in fashioning "clear and convincing evidence" standard
for involuntary commitments). See also Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042-44, 108
L. Ed. 2d 178, 204-06 (1990) (determination to forcibly medicate prisoner is decided by medi-
cal professionals-not judges); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (prisoner's transfer to a
mental hospital is "essentially medical" decision).
198. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), cited in Ford, 477 U.S.
399, 406 (1986).
199. Imprecise psychiatric judgments represent "at best a hazardous guess however consci-
entious." Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 23 (1950). See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct.
2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
200. See Homant, Kennedy, Kelly, & Williams, Ideology as a Determinant of Views on the
Insanity Defense, 14 J. CRIM. JusT. 37 (1986).
201. See Entin, supra note 58, at 230. History supports this analysis: Vietnam war sympa-
thizers tended to aid men desiring to avoid the military draft and pro-abortion advocates medi-
cally assisted women wanting abortions more often than those physicians with less compelling
convictions. Id.
202. See Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating "Insanity" on Death Row: Legal and Ethical
Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 175, 176 (1987) (Both the American Medical Association and
the American Psychiatric Association strongly urged physicians not to participate in legalized
state executions).
203. See Ewing, supra note 202, at 176 n.8.




ics.20 5 The American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American
Medical Association (AMA) 206 have adopted an official position on the con-
fficting medical and ethical issues regarding the due process rights of the
condemned felon whose competency depends upon medication.207 These
medical organizations resent having to comply with a judicial order compel-
ling medical professionals to administer antipsychotic drugs forcibly to a
death row inmate for the express purpose of achieving competency for exe-
cution. Although the APA and AMA have not provided medical profes-
sionals with specific guidance to resolve the death penalty conflict, each of
the Association's ethical principles prohibit a medical professional from par-
ticipating in a legally authorized execution. 208 Psychologists and psychia-
trists must "avoid any action that will violate or diminish the legal and civil
rights of clients or of others who may be affected by their actions.' ' 2° 9 More-
over, the physician's ethical duty to prevent harm to the patient is predicated
upon the Hippocratic Oath and other codes of ethics outlined by the Ameri-
can Medical Association.210
Scholars refer to Gary Alvord's treatment at the Florida mental institu-
tion as a required provision of care or cure that kills a patient.211 The
mental health and medical personnel treating Alvord criticized their forced
participation in restoring Alvord to sanity and thus medically creating com-
petency for execution. 212 The staff's position stemmed from their realization
that successful medical treatment of Alvord would result in his execution.21 3
Even after treating Alvord for two years, psychiatrists and staff reported
uneasiness, emotional conffict, and anger at the dilemma posed by Al-
vord.214 Other concerns developed among the staff over the issues of patient
205. See Salguero, supra note 207, at 178 n.64:
In a bizarre twist of the medical treatment situation, the express purpose of
competency treatment is to guarantee that the patient will be killed. On its face,
the purpose of the treatment is to cure the patient, and the consequence of the
cure is to enable the state to execute.
206. The American Psychiatric Association is a national organization consisting of approx-
imately 35,000 physicians who specialize in psychiatry. The American Medical Association is
a private non-profit organization of over 280,000 physicians and medical students. See Amici
Curiae Brief, supra note 16, at 1-2.
207. Id. at 3. See also Roth, APA Council Repor" The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 144
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 411, 412 (1987) (discussing APA position); Saguero, Medical Ethics and
Competency to be Executed, 96 YALE L.J. 167, 173-78 (1986) (discussing AMA position).
208. AMA Opinion 2.06 prohibits a physician from participating in a legally authorized
execution. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 16, at 2.
209. The American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychology, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 633, 634 (1981).
210. See Saguero, supra note 207, at 183 nn.89-93.
211. See Adler, supra note 13.
212. The American Psychiatric Association and the Florida State Hospital Human Rights
Advocacy Committee also joined the protest, fully supporting the "hospital staff who refuse on
ethical grounds to provide mental health treatment to Mr. Alvord for the purpose of making
him competent to be executed." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5, at 83.
213. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 9, at 303.
214. Id. at 303-06.
One psychiatrist reported first approaching Alvord as one would approach the
terminally ill; then thinking the inmate needed to be restored to competency so
he could defend himself, then trying to empathize with the victims' family; then
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confidentiality and the blurring of evaluative and treatment roles. 215 Even-
tually, only volunteer treatment staff worked with Alvord; most permanent
staff deemed the dilemma not only unresolvable, but also not worth the
moral strength to justify minimal involvement. 216
2. The Purpose of Restoration of Competency Is to Punish the Insane
Inmate
The Supreme Court has flatly held that states may not forcibly administer
antipsychotic drugs in order to punish a prisoner. 217 The majority in Harper
concluded that forcible medication does not violate a prisoner's constitu-
tional right if the drugs are administered solely for the purpose of treat-
ment218 and furthermore, that "the treatment in question will be ordered
only if it is in the prisoner's medical interests, given the legitimate needs of
his institutional confinement. ' 21 9 States forcibly medicate an insane death
row inmate, however, to restore competency so that the state may legally
execute. Forcible administration solely to create competency to execute ig-
nores the inmate's treatment needs or interests. The state's objective in for-
cibly medicating is not to treat the prisoner for his personal health and
welfare, nor to protect him from harming himself or others, but rather to
punish and kill the convicted felon. 220
When the Louisiana trial court ordered physicians to forcibly administer
the antypsychotic drug Haldol to Michael Perry for the purpose of maintain-
ing his competency for execution, the judicial order, in effect, became the
court's prescription pad to carry out the death sentence on Perry.221 The
order does not permit the physicians to administer antipsychotic drugs to
Perry pursuant to their professional medical judgment, but rather requires
the doctors to medicate Perry continuously. Because the order is not
designed to treat Michael, the physicians are not allowed to alter the dosage
or even cease the medication if Perry develops any of the disabling side ef-
fects which have previously plagued him.222
feeling very paternal toward the inmate; and then, finally, abandoning the hope
of finding an approach that 'worked' or 'felt comfortable.'
Id. at 303.
215. Iai
216. Id See also Adler, supra note 13.
217. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1047, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 211 (1990) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analyzing Supreme Court holding in Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) which recognizes a prisoner's constitutional right to be free from
involuntary transfer to mental hospitals for psychiatric treatment).
218. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1037, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 199.
219. Id. at 1037, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 199.
220. "Mhe medication order in this case rests only on the State's interest in facilitating
Perry's execution." Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 16, at 11.
221.
The Order does not direct the doctors to simply continue treating Michael as
they see fit. The judge has overridden the doctor's judgment, has substituted his
own "prescription" and has relegated the doctors to the status of technicians
whose purpose is to do whatever is necessary to groom Michael for execution.
See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 133, at 28.
222. See Hudsmith & Giarruso, supra note 16, at 38.
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Any attempt by states to forcibly medicate a death row inmate in order to
restore competency for execution is part and parcel of the state execution
order. Restoration is a step toward the inmate's execution, and thus repre-
sents a part of the inmate's punishment.
3. Restoration of Competency for Execution Offends Human Dignity
A determination to execute a criminal defendant is one of the most grave
decisions that citizens and public officials of the state must make.223 Even
when a felon has been convicted and sentenced to the death penalty, how-
ever, the Supreme Court still restricts a state's authority to implement the
death penalty by requiring that the state's authority "be exercised within the
limits of civilized standards. '224
Unable to arrive at a conclusive definition of competency for execution,
the Supreme Court expressly delegated to the states the responsibility to im-
plement competency standards that prevent execution of an insane pris-
oner. 225 Despite the Ford mandate, legislatures and courts have not
adequately resolved competency for execution procedures.226 The restora-
tion of competency standards promote confusion because most state statutes
invariably omit or only loosely define a synthetic sanity section in their com-
petency and capital punishment articles.227
In Florida, the restoration issue generated extreme conflict between the
legislative and judicial branches. In response to Ford, the Florida Supreme
Court promulgated Emergency Rules governing competency for execution
procedures and specifically included a section advocating restoration of com-
petency for execution by the use of psychotropic medication. 228 On the
223. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383 (1988).
224. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
225. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986) (Marshall J, plurality) ("[W]e leave
to the State the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon its execution of sentences").
226. See Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1061
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Mississippi's procedures for determining competency for exe-
cution are inconsistent with Ford and violate prisoner's constitutional due process rights).
227. Currently, 40 of the 50 states impose the death penalty. Of these states, only Mary-
land expressly addresses the synthetic sanity restoration of competency for execution issue.
See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
228. In re Emergency Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.811,
Competency to be Executed, 497 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1986). Rule 3.811(C), Effect Of Adjudica-
tion Of Incompetency To Be Executed: Psychotropic Medication provided:
(1) An adjudication of incompetency to be executed shall not operate as an
adjudication of incompetency to consent to medical treatment or for any other
purpose unless such other adjudication is specifically set forth in the order.
(2) A prisoner who, because of psychotropic medication, has sufficient ability
to understand the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be
imposed upon him or her shall not be deemed incompetent to be executed sim-
ply because his or her satisfactory mental condition is dependent upon such
medication.
(3) Psychotropic medication is any drug or compound affecting the mind,
behavior, intellectual functions, perception, moods, or emotion and includes




other hand, the legislative version,229 proposed by the Criminal Law Section
of the Florida Bar and subsequently adopted as the official rule, significantly
omitted the subsection expressly approving restoration of competency by
chemical treatment.230 Whether the omission represents Florida's lack of
endorsement 231 for executing an individual whose competency depends upon
psychotropic medication must await further determination by express legis-
lation or judicial interpretation of the statute.232
Texas is one of few states to address judicially this conflict concerning the
restoration of competency for execution. In Ex Parte Jordan 233 the highest
criminal court in Texas interpreted Ford to require a stay of execution,
rather than a permanent suspension, when an inmate is found incompe-
tent.234 Moreover, the court concluded that Ford does not require medical
treatment of an incompetent death row inmate. 235 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals analyzed the Texas statute prohibiting transfer of death
row inmates to mental institutions for medical restoration of competency 236
and held that the death row inmate's constitutional rights guaranteed only
in-house medical treatment. 237 Psychiatrists examining the incompetent in-
mate Jordan concluded that Jordan, who likely does not desire medical
treatment if it will ultimately result in his execution, could be restored to
competency for execution in the near future if given appropriate antip-
sychotic medication. 238 The court noted that since Texas law currently does
not allow transfer to a mental hospital for such extensive medical restoration
treatment, Texas must wait indefinitely for Jordan to regain competency. 239
The Texas court recognized this dilemma resulting from an incompetency
for execution determination and pleaded for a legislative resolution provid-
ing specific procedures governing medical restoration of competency for
execution.240
229. Florida temporarily adopted this Emergency rule until the Criminal Law Section of
The Florida Bar submitted permanent rules. The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar
subsequently endorsed the Final Rule, Criminal Procedure Rule 3.811, Insanity at the Time of
Execution: Capital Cases, effective December 31, 1987.
230. See supra note 226.
231. Telephone interview with Professor Gerald Bennett, Chairperson, Subcommittee on
Rule 3.811; Competency to be Executed, University of Florida School of Law (July 17, 1989);
and Professor Jim Ellis, Reporter, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS:
COMPETENCY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (July 19, 1989). Although neither could remem-
ber exactly why Subsection (c) was omitted, both recall discussing the medical and ethical
issues of competency based on medication. ("It's a catch-22 situation once you decide one has
to be executed." (Statement by Bennett)).
232. Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1988), the first Florida case to test its
state competency to be executed procedures in light of Ford, does not address whether syn-
thetic sanity can be induced by antipsychotic medication.
233. 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
234. Id. at 254.
235. Id.
236. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.01 § 2(a) (Vernon 1979) expressly precludes
transfer of death row prisoners to a mental facility.
237. Ex Parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d at 254.
238. Id. at 251 (court ordered continual 90-day competency evaluations of Jordan).
239. Id. at 255.
240. Id. at 253.
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Maryland is the only state to address legislatively medical restoration of a
death row prisoner.24' The Maryland statute incorporates Justice Powell's
two-pronged Ford standard242 to define specifically both a death row in-
mate243 and the standard of competency for execution.2 " Although Mary-
land has yet to utilize this statutory standard, the procedures seem
constitutionally adequate to execute a synthetically sane prisoner who has
been receiving medication prior to his or her competency for execution hear-
ing. The Maryland statute envisions a singular competency for execution
determination: if the inmate is found competent for execution, albeit through
synthetic sanity, then the state may proceed with its punishment of death; if
the inmate is found incompetent for execution, regardless of the anti-
psychotic medication or lack thereof, then the state must commute the sen-
tence to life imprisonment. At this point, Maryland is prohibited from
further attempting to involuntarily medicate the inmate with antipsychotic
drugs in order to create competency for execution.245
The other thirty-nine states that authorize the death penalty provide no
specific guidance for restoration of competency. Most state statutes follow
Ford and require suspended execution if a prisoner is determined incompe-
tent for execution. 246 The reprieve, however, concludes once the inmate has
241. "An inmate is not incompetent merely because his or her competence is dependent
upon continuing treatment, including the use of medication." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 75A(a)(2)(ii) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
242. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
243. "'Inmate' means an individual who has been convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A(a)(1) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
244. "'Incompetent' means the state of mind of an inmate who, as a result of a mental
disorder or mental retardation, lacks awareness:
1. Of the fact of his or her impending execution; and
2. He or she is to be executed for the crime of murder."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75 A(a)(2)(i) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
245. In 1985, Governer Hughes created a Task Force to address criminal mental health
services in Maryland. Maryland legislative history indicates that the Task Force struggled
with the restoration of competency issue.
One of the unfortunate by-products of precluding execution while an inmate
remains mentally incompetent is the awful dilemma it presents to the doctors
responsible for the inmate's medical care. They would be called upon to treat
the inmate so that he or she can regain sufficient competence to be gassed to
death. No attention was given to that problem by the Supreme Court, and little
or no attention has been given to it by any state legislature.
By a close vote, with less than half of the Task Force members voting, it was
recommended that the law provide that, if the court finds an inmate to be in-
competent, the sentence should be immediately commuted to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole. The Task Force recognizes that opinion may be
divided as to such a provision.
MARYLAND REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MENTALLY ILL DEFENDERS, at 26 (Dec.
1986).
246. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-9 n.2 (Marshall, J.).
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been "restored" to sanity,247 "recovers" his reason, 248 "becomes fit to be
executed," 249 is found "mentally competent to proceed, ' 250 has the "requi-
site mental capacity" 251 or is simply no longer insane.252 The state statutes
fail to define these terms or consider the impact of the restoration effect of
antipsychotic drugs upon the competency determination. Most of these
states merely transfer the incompetent prisoner to a mental hospital without
providing any procedure to restore competency for execution.2 53
The American Bar Association (ABA) recently promulgated Competence
and Capital Punishment standards as an addition to its ABA Criminal Jus-
tice Mental Health Standards (Standards). 25 4 The Standards provide guide-
lines limiting a state's authority to adjudicate criminal proceedings of a
mentally incompetent prisoner. 25 5 The Standards consider both the integ-
247. See ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982 & Supp. 1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4024
(1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3704.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN § 922.07(4)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431-240(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985
& Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.455(1) (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-6 (1984);
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW. § 655 (McKinney 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.30 (Anderson
1987 & Supp. 1989).
248. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2612 (Harrison Supp.
1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1008 (West 1986).
249. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-3(b)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-19-202(2) (1989).
250. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-113 (1990).
251. Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-902(f) (1987).
252. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-86-111 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006(4) (1988);
MAss. ANN LAWS ch. 279, § 62 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57
(1973 & Supp. 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 552.060(4) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2537 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-24 (1988).
253. The following states only provide general statutory procedures requiring transfer of
incompetent prisoners to state mental facilities: DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 406(a) (1987);
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-4-3 (Burns 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-82 (West 1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002 (1988 & Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-7 (1984 & Supp.
1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-220 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-13(2)
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-177.1. (1990).
Four states have adopted by judicial decision the common law rule prohibiting execution of
the insane; these states provide no guidance to the restoration of competency issue:
(1) Louisiana - State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 515, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (1943), LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 642 (West 1981);
(2) Pennsylvania - Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 22-23, 117 A.2d 96, 99
(1955), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7401 (Purdon Supp. 1990);
(3) Tennessee - Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 89-90, 135 S.W. 327, 329 (1911);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-3-402 (1984 & Supp. 1990);
(4) Washington - State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641, 651 (1940).
Idaho recently repealed IDAHO CODE § 19-2709-13 (1987), a statute specifically addressing
insanity and execution, but has yet to replace it with another provision. The remaining states
with the death penalty, Texas and Vermont, lack a specific statute addressing either compe-
tency for execution or restoration of competency for execution.
Ten states currently do not have the death penalty, and therefore have not devised compe-
tency for execution statutes: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Oregon.
254. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in August 1984, constitute official ABA policy. The House of Delegates
approved Competence and Capital Punishment Standards in August, 1987 and Competence
and Confession Standards in August, 1988.
255. Courts, however, are not bound to follow the ABA Standards. See Rector v. Lock-
hart, 727 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (after mental competency team evaluated
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rity of the criminal justice system and the insane death row inmate's rights,
yet refrain from taking an active position on the controversial nature of the
death penalty. 256
Specifically, Standard 7-5.6 defines mental competency for execution and
provides for a stay of the death sentence upon a finding of mental incompe-
tency.257 The Standard incorporates Justice Powell's two-pronged Ford
standard into a four-part test.258 In addition to understanding the nature of
the punishment and the rationale behind infliction of the death penalty, the
convict must possess the rational capability to understand the criminal pro-
ceedings and must maintain sufficient ability to assist and aid an attorney in
the defense. 259
Standard 7-5.7 provides general guidelines for the medical professional to
conduct a competency for execution evaluation. 26° Yet the Standard's resto-
ration of competency procedures, like the state statutes, are ambiguous. The
Standard merely provides for an evaluation of the inmate's "current mental
condition" at a judicial hearing when the death row inmate has been "re-
stored to competence.1 261
Pursuant to Ford, the ABA recommends that states develop their own
restoration of competency procedures.262 The Standard, however, sidesteps
the issue regarding execution of a death row inmate whose mental compe-
tence depends solely upon psychotropic medication. 263 Additionally, despite
the moral conflict created by forcible state administration of antipsychotic
Rector under both Ford and ABA Standards regarding competency for execution, the court
held "While the latter [ABA Standards] are interesting, they have no legal effect").
256. Standard 7-5.5, ABA MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS: COMPETENCE AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1987).
257. Id. Standard 7-5.6(a).
258. Id. Standard 7-5.6(b).
259. Id. Commentary to Standard 7-5.6 states that the primary rationale for expanding
Powell's two-pronged test is based on the integrity of the criminal judicial system: "The possi-
bility that a defendant could be executed because of inability to communicate information that
could be relevant to the decision whether to carry out the death sentence is equally unaccept-
able as executing someone who could not understand the penalty." Commentary to Standard
7-5.6, n.7.
The Standard also incorporates the test for competency from Justice Frankfurter's dissent-
ing opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20 n.3. (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
One state, Mississippi, has officially adopted this four-part test. See Billiot v. State, 515 So. 2d
1234 (Miss. 1987); MISs. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (2)(a) (1973 & Supp. 1988).
260. Standard 7-5.7, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS: COMPE-
TENCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987).
261. Id. Standard 7-5.7(i).
262. Id.
The Standard leaves to the discretion of the states the issue of whether to seek
restoration of competence and whether to attempt to persuade the court to lift
the stay of execution. Although it is beyond the scope of these Standards, it is
important for states to address the issues raised by permanently incompetent
convicts on death row.
Commentary to Standard 7-5.7.
263. Id. Commentary to Standard 7-5.7 expressly states: "The Standard does not address
the issue of possible therapeutic or habilitative efforts to restore the competence of a con-




medication to death row inmates, 264 the ABA refused to take a position on
the death row prisoner's right to refuse treatment.265 Nonetheless, the ABA
Standards maintain that the defendant must possess the necessary mental
capacity to work with his or her attorneys in preparation of a defense. 266
The Standards thus do not recognize a defendant's right to refuse reasonable
treatment creating competency to stand trial.2 6 7
The Ford Court expressly held that the lack of state statutes advocating
execution of insane death row inmates established that civilized society was
fundamentally offended by such cruel and unusual punishment.268 Simi-
larly, the lack of state statutes, the opinions of medical professionals, and the
unclear stance adopted by the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Stan-
dards regarding restoration of competency for execution reveals that society
is morally and ethically offended when states administer medication solely
for the purposes of grooming an inmate for execution. "Objective evidence
of contemporary values" indicating an emerging national consensus against
execution of synthetically restored individuals supports evidence that execut-
ing the restored inmate is an affront to the fundamental human dignity pro-
tected by the eighth amendment. 269
C. Restoration of Competency for Execution Violates the
Fourteenth Amendment
When a "sufficient doubt" of incompetency exists, due process requires a
hearing to determine legal competency to stand trial;270 when a "reasonable
probability" of insanity exists, due process and the eighth amendment re-
quire suspension of the death sentence. 271 Ford requires the prisoner to
demonstrate only a "threshold showing" of insanity in order to initiate the
competency evaluation and hearing process.272 "Reasonable probability"
and "threshold showing," however, do not implicate the same standard.273
Whether Ford's threshold requirement is applicable in the restoration con-
264. Id,
265. Id.
266. See Standard 7-4.10(c) and Commentary to Standard 7-4.10(c), ABA CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS: COMPETENCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987).
267. Id.
268. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
269. This proposal has received much attention and favorable response. See Amnesty In-
ternational Declaration on Doctors and the Death Penalty, adopted March 1981, cited in AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5, at 84 (opposes physician determination of competency
for execution).
270. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966); Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523,
1561 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
271. See Billiot v. State, 478 So. 2d 1043, 1045 (Miss. 1985), 515 So. 2d 1234 (Miss. 1987);
Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
272. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 ("high threshold") (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens, J.J.); Id. at 426 ("substantial threshold") (Powell J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment).
See Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d at 337-39 (prisoner must make substantial threshold show-
ing of insanity to rebut presumption of sanity and initiate hearing requirement; testimony by
two expert witnesses inadequate to make prima facie showing of incompetency when Missis-
sippi prosecution contradicted with expert testimony).
273. In Billiot v. State, 515 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Miss. 1987) the court questioned the viabil-
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text remains to be seen.274
Because a Ford hearing occurs after conviction and sentencing,275 both a
judicial determination that the prisoner is competent to stand trial and a
fact-finding determination that the prisoner is sane at the time of the offense
have already occurred. 276 The state may base its presumption that the pris-
oner is sane and competent for execution on these two prior competency
evaluations.277 A Ford determination of incompetency for execution, how-
ever, extinguishes the state's presumption of sanity. As a result, any medical
evaluation determining restoration of competency must overcome the clear
presumption and factual finding of incompetency. 278 Additionally, once
found competent the defendant inmate can make repeated requests for new
incompetency hearings immediately prior to execution. 279 Although the
state possesses a strong interest in preventing the death row inmate from
abusing insanity claims in order to delay execution, 2 0 the insane inmate
possesses an equally strong due process interest in avoiding execution if
incompetent. 28'
The Supreme Court held in Harper that "[t]he liberty of citizens to resist
the administration of mind altering drugs arises from our Nation's most ba-
sic values."' 28 2 The Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment pro-
ity of Mississippi's statute since state statutes must yield when the U.S. Constitution guaran-
tees a broader right.
274. Standard 7-5.7(f) requires a "preponderance of the evidence" standard for a determi-
nation of incompetency for execution.
Some states utilize Powell's two-pronged standard in Ford; others institute a Dusky or com-
mon law M'Naughten standard in determining competency for execution. See Ward, Compe-
tency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35, 60-61, 101-07
(1986).
275. See Hance v. Kemp, 258 Ga. 649, 373 S.E.2d 184, 192 (1988) (Ford-hearings may only
result when execution is immediate; habeas corpus allegation of present sanity is premature for
Ford competency for execution purposes).
276. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
277. Id. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 429
(O'Connor, J., with White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Evans v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986) (sister's affidavit that death row
inmate brother is currently insane is not sufficient to overcome state presumption of sanity).
278. See Note, Eighth Amendment- The Constitutional Rights of the Insane on Death Row,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 844, 863 (1986).
279. Standard 7-5.7(h), ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS: COM-
PETENCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987) (counsel, however, may not plead incompetency
merely to delay the proceedings).
See Salguero, supra note 207, at 179 n.71; see also State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 564 (La.
1986) (state will not impose death penalty if inmate found insane subsequent to conviction for
murder); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 642 (West 1981) (prisoner possesses right to
question "at any time" competency for execution). Cf Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523,
1560 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (theoretically, repeated competency determinations are permissible, yet
the probability of erroneous incompetency claims is high).
280. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897) (court's fear of repeated compe-
tency claims factor in denial of jury trial to determine competency after sentence).
281. Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (O'Connor, J., with White, J., concurring in result in part and
dissenting in part).
282. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1045, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 208 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, J.J.); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds"), quoted in Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1045 n.3, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 209.
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tects a prisoner's liberty interest in refusing forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs.283 Execution achieved solely by synthetic sanity resto-
ration deprives the death row inmate of his or her liberty interest in a basic
and fundamental sense.
If the standard of restoration of competency for execution refers only to
the defendant's ability to function and to make a connection between death
and his crime, then courts likely will hold an insane, yet technically syntheti-
cally sane, convicted inmate competent. On the other hand, if the standard
of restoration of competency for execution incorporates the spirit of Ford,
Penry, and Harper, then courts may find a constitutional due process justifi-
cation to prohibit execution through synthetic sanity restoration. Under a
due process analysis, a court must balance the death row inmate's liberty
interest in protecting his dignity and bodily integrity against a state's alleged
reasons for invading individual liberty.284 Ford posits the rationale for accu-
rate and reliable truth finding procedures by providing increased due process
protection for capital defendants. 285 Since complete consideration of miti-
gating evidence enhances the reliability of the jury sentencing decision,
Penry proposes the argument that evidence of competency based on antip-
sychotic medicine must be individually evaluated to determine competency
for execution. 28 6 Although the majority did not universally recognize the
prisoner's due process liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic
drugs, Harper interpreted the due process clause to permit states to adminis-
ter antipsychotic drugs against an inmate's consent only when the inmate is
dangerous to himself or herself or others, and the medication is in the best
interest of the prisoner. 287 Thus, the forcible administration of antipsychotic
drugs must, in some way, further legitimate penal interests. Penology is de-
fined as "the science of prison management and rehabilitation of
criminals. ' 288 Because the capital punishment context lacks any rehabilita-
tive characteristic, this standard appears meaningless in a restoration of
competency for execution analysis. 28 9
The death row inmate's entire medical history is relevant when a panel of
psychiatrists observe the appearance and demeanor of the prisoner to deter-
mine competency for execution.29° Psychiatric and medical experts experi-
ence difficult problems in evaluating and diagnosing mental competency. 291
This task, therefore, should not be obscured by altering the conduct or
masking the major symptoms of the inmate's mental disorder with antip-
283. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 198 (1990).
284, See Youngblood v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982).
285. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 95-101, 110-16 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.
288. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1021 (5th ed. 1979).
289. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), the
Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the death sentence is "unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice."
290. Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp 1523, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("a court must thoroughly
acquaint itself with the defendant's mental condition" when competency for execution is at
issue).
291. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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sychotic drugs. A medical evaluation of competency should be conducted
after the inmate's mental condition stabilizes at a predictable level. Other-
wise, a state cannot guarantee that the inmate is in fact competent at the
time of his execution as required by Ford. Although a defendant's rights are
limited in a hearing to determine competency for execution, medicating a
defendant and then evaluating the prisoner's competency in the medicated
state does not comport with the insane prisoner's constitutionally protected
due process rights and, furthermore, is not the type of fact finding procedure
protected by the Constitution.
D. Proposal: Commute the Death Sentence to Life Imprisonment Upon a
Determination of Incompetency for Execution
English common law presents a strong and consistent precedent to com-
mute death sentences for persons found incompetent for execution. 292 Since
the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976, no state has par-
ticipated in an execution involving a prisoner found incompetent for execu-
tion and then restored to sanity.293 If either Gary Alvord or Michael Perry
is executed, he likely will be the first.294
Both scholars295 and medical organizations 296 who have examined Al-
vord's unique case agree that executing Gary Alvord would cause ethical,
medical, social, and economic problems that far surpass any potential bene-
fits for the state of Florida. 297 Medical experts have concluded that Gary
Alvord suffers from a continuing mental illness extensively documented
since early childhood. 298 While he has experienced some periods of lucidity,
those periods are both infrequent and solely the result of the medication. 299
Alvord continues to be mentally ill; yet Florida spends time, money, and
292. England routinely commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment between the
early 1840s and 1965. See R. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT 15 (1986); 1 N. WALKER,
CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 205 (1967); Feltham,
The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4 MELB. U.L. REV. 434, 475
(1964). See also Radelet & Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determination of Competency
to be Executed, 14 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 37, 38-39 (1986) (analyzing common
law prohibition against executing the insane).
293. Letter from Bonnie R. Strickland, Ph.D., President, American Psychological Associa-
tion to The Honorable Bob Martinez, Governor of Florida (August 20, 1987) [hereinafter
STRICKLAND LETTER].
294. Id.
295. See Adler, supra note 13, at 33; Radelet & Barnard, supra note 9, at 300.
296. See STRICKLAND LETTER, supra note 293; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5,
at 83.
297. Although the ethical and moral issues overshadow fiscal concerns, it should be noted
on monetary grounds alone, ample reasons exist to commute the death penalty to life impris-
onment. A 1982 study by the New York Public Defenders Association indicated that the cost
of litigating an average New York death penalty case costs approximately $1.8 million; an
average life imprisonment case costs approximately $602,000. Absent commutation, the uni-
queness of the death sentence guarantees that the costs of medical treatment and security will
greatly surpass the cost of treating other inmates. The cost of execution also includes complex
mental health evaluations and prolonged litigation. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5,
at 170,
298. TANAY LETTER, supra note 134, at 8; Adler, supra note 13, at 32.
299. TANAY LETTER, supra note 134, at 8-12; Adler, supra note 13, at 32.
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medical resources on him so that he can be readied and groomed for execu-
tion. When Alvord arrived at the hospital, the Florida State Hospital
Human Rights Advocacy Committee, a group of hospital staff, took offense
at what they saw as a misuse of medical resources and recommended that a
sentence of life imprisonment be instated whenever a death row prisoner has
been declared mentally incompetent for execution.300
A logical alternative to the troubling issues posed by incompetency and
restoration of competency for execution is to grant clemency to Gary Alvord
and Michael Perry and commute their death sentences to consecutive life
terms with no parole. The proposal to commute the death sentence to life
imprisonment when a convicted felon becomes incompetent for execution
reflects both the constitutional and common law prohibition against execut-
ing a mentally incompetent individual as cruel and unusual punishment.30 1
Allowing psychiatric treatment to result in the patient's death compromises
medical ethics and degrades both the state's interest in promoting public
health care and the judicial deference reserved for the physician in diagnos-
ing medical conditions.
1. The State Perspective
From the state perspective, the societal value of restoring competency for
the express purpose to execute does not outweigh the inmate's right to com-
mutation. States have a constitutional duty and recognized interest in ad-
ministering medical treatment to incarcerated mentally ill individuals.30 2
Under Harper, however, the duty permits forcible medication only when the
inmate is dangerous to himself or herself, others, or property. 30 3 States also
have a duty to minimalize criminal acts against society. If the administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs restores competency which ultimately results in
execution, then the state achieves its societal goal of protecting the commu-
nity against dangerous offenders. Society, however, can maintain its crimi-
nal protection simply by not releasing the convicted inmate back into the
mainstream of society.3°4 At least one state, Maryland, has enacted a statute
300. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5, at 84 n.15. The Florida State Hospital
Human Rights Advocacy Committee recommended that a death row inmate who has been
determined to lack the mental capacity to be executed should have his sentence commuted to
life imprisonment before being sent to a state facility for mental health treatment. See supra
note 212.
301. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing Sir Edward Coke for the rationale that executing an
insane person is "a miserable spectacle, both against Law, and of extream inhumanity and
cruelty, and can be no example to others"); see also Standard 7-5.6, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS: COMPETENCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987) (opposing
execution of inmates whose incompetence resulted from either mental illness or mental
retardation).
302. A prisoner has an eighth amendment right to adequate medical treatment for known
medical problems. See Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1045, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 208 (1990); Adding-
ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). See also 18
U.S.C. § 4245 (1988) (requiring hospitalization of a prisoner suffering from mental disease or
defect).
303. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1044, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 207 (1990).
304. A survey of over 900 Georgia residents, three-fourths of whom advocated capital pun-
ishment, indicated that 52% would favor, as an alternative to the death penalty, life imprison-
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whereby the death sentence of an inmate determined incompetent for execu-
tion is automatically commuted to life imprisonment.30 5 Thus, a prisoner
once sentenced to death remains in a lifetime maximum security setting
either in a Maryland state penitentiary or in a mental hospital.
2. The Medical Perspective
From a medical perspective, the decision whether to provide psychiatric
and medical treatment to an incompetent inmate in order to groom the in-
mate for execution or to refuse treatment places doctors in an emotional and
ethical conflict. If a physician withholds psychiatric or medical treatment,
then incompetency has been prolonged, and the state will forego execution.
By doing so, however, the doctor inhumanely confines the inmate to a life of
mental anguish and torment. 3°6 The ethical decision to perpetuate the death
sentence compromises the physician's duty to cure the patient and psycho-
logically impairs an inmate's ability and motivation to heal.
Psychiatric treatment is an essentially medical function. 30 7 States thus
should defer to the ethical duty of the medical profession to cause no harm
to patients by continuing to recognize the common law right to commuta-
tion upon a determination of insanity. Since states have no constitutionally
acceptable interest in carrying out the death penalty against the insane,30
states should not be permitted to transform medical treatment of the death
row inmate into a device merely to punish by execution. Providing medical
treatment aimed at executing the patient once cured directly conflicts with
society's humanitarian commitment to medically treat prisoners. Commuta-
tion, therefore, resolves the dilemma posed by the successful introduction of
antipsychotic drugs into medical treatment.3°9
3. The Death Row Inmate's Perspective
From the death row inmate's perspective, due process liberty interests and
individual constitutional rights outweigh the societal value of restoring com-
petency for execution. If treatment of the insane prisoner only temporarily
restores the inmate to sanity and does not cure the mental disorder, then due
ment with no possibility of parole for 25 years combined with a societal restitution program.
See Thomas & Hutcheson, 1986, cited in K. HAAS & J. INCIARDI, CHALLENGING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: LEGAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES at 11 (1988).
305. If the court finds the inmate to be incompetent it shall revoke the warrant to
execute the death sentence and remand the case to the court in which the sen-
tence of death was imposed, which shall strike the sentence of death and enter in
its place a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The
sentence shall be mandatory and may not be suspended, in whole or in part.
MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 75A(d)(3) (1987 & Supp. 1988).
306. See Adler, supra note 13, at 29. ("The suffering of psychotics is one of the most intense
sufferings that can be experienced.... We don't feel comfortable not treating these people
[under death sentences], but we feel even less comfortable treating them." Statement by Dr.
Paul Appelbaum, Chairman of the American Psychiatric Association Commission on Judicial
Action).
307. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
308. Ford, 477 U.S. 399, 413 (1986).
309. Adler, supra note 13, at 33.
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process requires an examination of not only when the execution should oc-
cur but whether the prisoner should ever be executed. Although a death row
prisoner possesses fewer constitutional rights and less guaranteed protections
than a prisoner at trial or sentencing, Ford's "evolving standards of decency"
seemingly prohibit restoration of competency for execution. A logical alter-
native, therefore, involves commutation of the sentence to life imprisonment.
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution permits and a majority of the states exercise capital pun-
ishment, the most severe and detrimental deprivation of liberty that a state
can impose upon a citizen. Despite one's position on capital punishment as a
moral or public policy issue, the overwhelming body of both common law
and constitutional law indicates that society must not execute insane prison-
ers. Although public opinion polls do not always consistently reflect public
sentiment, certain identifiable segments in society, especially the medical
profession, do not support restoration of competency for execution.
Different standards of insanity are imposed on the defendant at different
periods throughout the criminal proceeding. Although a majority of courts
and the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards strongly support
competency to stand trial based on antipsychotic drugs, neither the courts
nor the ABA have upheld the administration of antipsychotic drugs to a
death row inmate in order to determine mental competency for execution.
In Ford v. Wainwright the Supreme Court upheld the common law philos-
ophy prohibiting execution of insane convicts under the eighth amendment,
questioned the constitutionality of state procedures to evaluate the mental
status of death row inmates, and guaranteed insane convicted capital offend-
ers certain due process rights, including those in the post-conviction hearing
stage. Yet the ambiguous and complex holding in Ford does not provide the
states with a bright line rule for devising fair and constitutional standards for
restoration of competency. Nevertheless, the procedural death penalty re-
quirements and its imposition on executions of the mentally ill in Ford and
the mentally retarded in Penry provide important insight into the issue of
restoration of competency for execution.
While compelling arguments indicate that a prisoner in the post-convic-
tion stage should receive only minimal consideration of mental capacity in
any form, including medical restoration, equally compelling arguments in-
corporate common law and Ford's eighth amendment prohibition against
executing an insane prisoner. In addition to the protection of fundamental
dignity in Ford, medical ethics and a prisoner's constitutional right to treat-
ment also provide "objective evidence of contemporary values" that commu-
tation is necessary to avoid an eighth amendment violation of cruel and
unusual punishment.
A requirement that states should carefully evaluate a person's restored
mental capacity would ensure the fourteenth amendment due process safe-
guards envisioned by Ford and Harper. Medical professionals must be al-
lowed to administer antipsychotic medication pursuant to the inmate's
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personal medical treatment needs; states should not seek forcible administra-
tion of the antipsychotic drugs because the intended result is to punish,
rather than cure, the inmate by grooming him or her for execution. Finally,
if the medically created synthetic sanity is a "but for" cause of Ford's two-
pronged requirement that an inmate understands both the death penalty and
the reason behind its imposition, then due process guarantees have not ade-
quately protected the insane death row inmate's constitutional rights; the
antipsychotic medication creates only fleeting competency, and does not
cure the mentl disorder. The ultimate analysis, however, rests on the evolv-
ing standards of decency guiding contemporary society. Responsibility
turns not on whether the state can restore a death row inmate to synthetic
sanity and thereby create legal competency, but on whether society has a
duty to ensure that a prisoner, according to constitutional standards, pos-
sesses the capacity to be executed.
